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Abstract
This paper investigates capabilities of Privacy-Preserving Deep Learning (PPDL)
mechanisms against various forms of privacy attacks. First, we propose to quantita-
tively measure the trade-off between model accuracy and privacy losses incurred
by reconstruction, tracing and membership attacks. Second, we formulate recon-
struction attacks as solving a noisy system of linear equations, and prove that
attacks are guaranteed to be defeated if condition (2) is unfulfilled. Third, based
on theoretical analysis, a novel Secret Polarization Network (SPN) is proposed to
thwart privacy attacks, which pose serious challenges to existing PPDL methods.
Extensive experiments showed that model accuracies are improved on average by
5-20% compared with baseline mechanisms, in regimes where data privacy are
satisfactorily protected.
1 Introduction
Privacy-preserving deep learning (PPDL) aims to collaboratively train and share a deep neural
network model among multiple participants, without exposing to each other information about their
private training data. This typical federated learning setting is particularly attractive to business
scenarios in which raw data e.g. medical records or bank transactions are too sensitive and valuable
to be disclosed to other parties [11, 20]. While differential privacy based approaches e.g. [1, 15]
attract much attentions due to its theoretical guarantee of privacy protection and low computational
complexity [4, 5], there is a fundamental trade-off between privacy guarantee vs utility of learned
models, i.e. overly conservative privacy protections often significantly deteriorate model utilities
(accuracies for classification models). Existing solutions e.g. [1, 15] are unsatisfactory in our view
— low  privacy budget value does not necessarily lead to desired levels of privacy protection. For
instance, the leakage of shared gradients may admit complete reconstruction of training data under
certain circumstances [21, 18, 19, 8], even though substantial fraction of gradients elements are
truncated [15] or large random noise are added [1].
In order to make critical analysis and fair evaluations of different PPDL algorithms, we argue that
one must employ an objective evaluation protocol to quantitatively measure privacy preserving
capabilities against various forms of privacy attacks. Following a privacy adversary approach [6, 12],
we propose to evaluate the admitted privacy loss by three objective measures i.e. reconstruction,
tracing and membership losses, with respect to the accuracies of protected models. To this end,
Privacy-Preserving Characteristic (PPC) curves are used to delineate the trade-off, with Calibrated
Averaged Performance (CAP) faithfully quantifying a given PPC curve. These empirical measures
complement the theoretical bound of the privacy loss and constitute the first contribution of our work
(see Figure 5 for example PPC).
As demonstrated by experimental results in Sect. 4, the leakage of shared gradients poses serious
challenges to existing PPDL methods[1, 15, 21]. Our second contribution, therefore, is a novel
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(a) Attack Batch Size 1 (b) Attack Batch Size 8
Figure 1: Comparison of Calibrated Averaged Performances (CAPs) for the proposed SPN, PPDL [15] and DP
[1] methods, against reconstruction, membership and tracing attacks (CAP the higher the better, see threat model
and evaluation protocol in Sect. 2.1). (a): CIFAR10/100 models attacked with batch size 1; (b): CIFAR10/100
models attacked with batch size 8.
secret polarization network (SPN) and a polarization loss term, which bring about two advantages in
tandem with public backbone networks — first, SPN helps to defeat privacy attacks by adding secrete
and element-wise adaptive gradients to shared gradients; second, the added polarization loss acts as
a regularization term to consistently improve the classification accuracies of baseline networks in
federated learning settings. This SPN based mechanism has demonstrated strong capability to thwart
three types of privacy attacks without significant deterioration of model accuracies. As summarized by
CAP values in Fig. 1, SPN compares favorably with existing solutions [15] and [1] with pronounced
improvements of performances against reconstruction, membership and tracing attacks.
Our third contribution is the formulation of reconstruction attacks as solving a noisy system of linear
equations, and it is proved that reconstructions are guaranteed to fail if the necessary condition (2) in
Theorem 2.2 is purposely invalidated. This theoretical analysis sheds new light on the effectiveness
of DP based privacy preserving mechanisms.
1.1 Related Work
[1] demonstrated how to maintain data privacy by adding Gaussian noise to shared gradients during
the training of deep neural networks. [15] proposed to randomly select and share a small fraction of
gradient elements (those with large magnitudes) to reduce privacy loss. Although both methods [1, 15]
offered strong differential privacy (DP) guarantees [4, 5], as shown by [12, 21] and our empirical
studies, pixel-level reconstructions of training data and disclosing of membership information raise
serious concerns about potential privacy loss.
Dwork et.al. [6] have formulated privacy attacks towards a database, as a series of queries maliciously
chosen according to an attack strategy designed to compromise privacy. Among three privacy attacks
i.e. reconstruction,tracing and re-identification discussed in [6], the detrimental reconstruction attack
is formulated as solving a noisy system of linear equations, and reconstruction errors are essentially
bounded by the worst-case accuracies of query answers (Theorem 1 in [6]). However, this formulation
is not directly applicable to deep learning, since queries about private training data are not explicitly
answered during the training or inferencing of DNNs.
In the context of deep learning, membership attacks was investigated in [16] while [7] demonstrated
that recognizable face images can be recovered from confidence values revealed along with predictions.
[12] demonstrated with both CNNs and RNNs that periodical gradient updates during training leaked
information about training data, features as well as class memberships. Possible defences such as
selective gradient sharing, reducing dimensionality, and dropout were proved to be ineffective or had
a negative impact on the quality of the collaboratively trained model. Based on the assumption that
activation functions are twice-differentiable, recent attacks were proposed to reconstruct training data
with pixel-level accuracies [21, 18, 19, 8]. These recent reconstruction attacks were adopted in the
present work to evaluate capabilities of privacy-preserving strategies proposed in [1, 15, 12, 21], with
extensive experiments conducted over different networks and datasets (see Sect. 4 and supplementary
material).
Homomorphic-Encryption (HE) based [9, 10, 2] and Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) based
privacy-preserving approaches [14, 13] demonstrated strong privacy protection via encryption, but
often incur significantly more demanding computational and communication costs. For instance, [2]
reported 2-3 times communication overheads and [13, 3] had to speed up highly-intensive computation
with efficient implementations. In this paper our work is only compared with Differential Privacy
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Figure 2: Three privacy attacks considered in this work (see text in Sect. 2).
based mechanisms [15, 1], and we refer readers to [20, 17] for thorough reviews of HE and MPC
based privacy-preserving methods therein.
2 Privacy Attacks on Training Data
In this work we consider a distributed learning scenario, in which K(K ≥ 2) participants collabora-
tively learn a multi-layered deep learning model without exposing their private training data (this
setting is also known as federated learning [11, 20]). We assume one participant is the honest-but-
curious adversary. The adversary is honest in the sense that he/she faithfully follows the collaborative
learning protocol and does not submit any malformed messages, but he/she may launch privacy
attacks on the training data of other participants, by analyzing periodic updates to the joint model
(e.g. gradients) during training.
Fig. 2 illustrates three privacy attacks considered in this work. The goal of reconstruction attack is to
recover original training data x as accurate as possible by analyzing the publicly shared gradients,
which might be perturbed by privacy-preserving mechanisms. Subsequent membership attack and
tracing attack are based on reconstruction attacks — for the former, membership labels are derived
either directly during the reconstruction stage or by classifying reconstructed data; for the latter, the
goal is to determine whether a given training data item belongs to certain participant, by comparing it
against reconstructed data1.
2.1 Evaluation of Trade-off by Privacy Preserving Mechanism
We assume there is a Privacy-Preserving Mechanism (PPM)2 M that aims to defeat the privacy
attacks A by modifying the public information from G to G¯m = M(G,m), that is exchanged
during the learning stage and m is the controlling parameter of the amount of changes exerted
on G. This modification protects the private information x from being disclosed to the adversary,
who can only make an estimation based on public information i.e. x¯m = A(G¯m). Needless to
say, a PPM can defeat any adversaries by introducing exorbitant modification so that dist(x¯, x)
is as large as possible, where dist() is a properly defined distance measure such as MSE. The
modification of public information, however, inevitably deteriorates the performances of global
models i.e. Acc(G¯m) ≤ Acc(Gm), where Acc() denotes model performances such as accuracies or
1Note that membership inference in [12] is the tracing attack considered in our work.
2We do not restrict ourselves to privacy mechanisms considered by differential privacy[4, 5, 15, 1].
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any other metrics that is relevant to the model task in question. A well-designed PPM is expected to
have Acc(G¯m) as high as possible.
We propose to plot Privacy Preserving Characteristic (PPC) to illustrate the trade-off between two
opposing goals i.e. to maintain high model accuracies and low privacy losses as follows,
Definition 1 (Privacy Preserving Characteristic). For a given Privacy-Preserving MechanismM,
its privacy loss and performance trade-off is delineated by a set of calibrated performances i.e.
{Acc(G¯m) · dist(x¯m, x)|m ∈ {m1, · · · ,mn}}, where Acc() is the model performance, dist()
a distance measure, G¯m = M(G,m) is the modified public information, x is the private data,
x¯m = A(G¯m) is the estimation of private data by the attack and m the controlling parameter of the
mechanism.
Moreover, Calibrated Averaged Performance (CAP) for a given PPC is defined as follows,
CAP (M,A) = 1
n
mn∑
m=m1
Acc(G¯m) · dist(x¯m, x). (1)
Fig. 5 illustrates example PPCs of different mechanisms against privacy attacks. One may also
quantitatively summarize PPCs with CAP — the higher the CAP value is, the better the mechanism
is at preserving privacy without compromising the model performances (see Table 1).
2.2 Formulation of Reconstruction Attack
Consider a neural network Ψ(x;w, b) : X → RC , where x ∈ X , w and b are the weights and biases
of neural networks, and C is the output dimension. In a machine learning task, we optimize the
parameters w and b of neural network Ψ with a loss function L(Ψ(x;w, b), y), where x is the input
data and y is the ground truth labels. We denote the superscript w[i] and b[i] as the i-th layer weights
and biases. The following theorem proves that the reconstruction of input x exists under certain
conditions (proofs are given in Appendix A, in supplementary material due to the limited space).
Theorem 2.1. Suppose a multilayer neural network Ψ := Ψ[L−1] ◦Ψ[L−2] ◦ · · · ◦Ψ[0]( · ;w, b) is
C1, where the i-th layer Ψ[i] is a fully-connected layer3 Then, initial input x∗ of Ψ exists, provided
that: if there is an i (1 ≤ i ≤ L) such that
1. Jacobian matrix Dx
(
Ψ[i−1] ◦Ψ[i−1] ◦ · · · ◦Ψ[0]) around x is full-rank;
2. Partial derivative ∇b[i]L
(
Ψ(x;w, b), y
)
4 is nonsingular.
If assumptions in Theorem 2.1 are met, we can pick an index set I from row index set of
∇w[i],b[i]L
(
Ψ(x;w, b), y
)
such that the following linear equation is well-posed,
BI · x = WI ,
where BI := ∇Ib[i]L
(
Ψ(x;w, b), y
)
and WI := ∇Iw[i]L
(
Ψ(x;w, b), y
)
. According to Theorem 2.1,
the initial input x∗ is
(
Ψ[i−1] ◦Ψ[i−1] ◦ · · · ◦Ψ[0])−1(x).
The linear system can be composed from any subsets of observed gradients elements, and the
reconstruction solution exists as long as the condition of full rank matrix is fulfilled. For common
privacy-preserving strategies adopted in a distributed learning scenario such as sharing fewer gradients
or adding noisy to shared gradients [15, 1, 12], the following theorem proves that input x can be
reconstructed from such a noisy linear system, if condition (2) is fulfilled.
Theorem 2.2. Suppose there are perturbations EB , EW added on BI ,WI , respectively, such that
observed measurements B¯I = BI + EB , W¯I = WI + EW . Then, the reconstruction x∗ of the
initial input x can be determined by solving a noisy linear system B¯I · x∗ = W¯I , provided that
‖B−1I · EB‖ < 1; (2)
3Any convolution layers can be converted into a fully-connected layer by simply stacking together spatially
shifted convolution kernels (see proofs in supplementary material).
4We write the partial derivative as a diagonal matrix that each two adjacent diagonal entries in an order are
two copies of each entry in∇b[i]L
(
Ψ(x;w, b), y
)
, see proofs in Appendix for details.
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Figure 3: Our proposed SPN architecture that consists of a public and a private network (see text in Sect. 3).
Moreover, the relative error is bounded,
‖x∗ − x‖
‖x‖ ≤
1
1− ‖B−1I · EB‖
(‖EB‖
‖BI‖ +
‖EW ‖
‖WI‖
)
, (3)
in which B−1I is the inverse of BI .
In the deep leakage approach [21], the recovery of initial image requires model parametersW and the
corresponding gradients∇W such that a minimization of gradient differences Ep := ||∇W ′−∇W||
yields a recovery x¯ of initial image. The minimizing errorEp introduces more errors to the noisy linear
system. Therefore, for any iterative reconstruction algorithms like [21] to be successful, condition
‖B−1I ·EB‖ < 1 is necessary. In other words, a sufficiently large perturbation ‖EB‖ > ‖BI‖ such
as Gaussian noise is guaranteed to defeat reconstruction attacks. To our best knowledge, (2) is the
first analysis that elucidates a theoretical guarantee for thwarting reconstruction attacks like [21].
Nevertheless, existing mechanisms [15, 1] have to put up with significant drops in model accuracy
incurred by high levels of added noise (see Sect. 4.2).
3 Privacy Preserving with Secret Polarization Network
In Sect. 2 we have proved that the necessary condition of successful reconstruction attack is unfulfilled
if sufficiently large perturbations are added. We illustrate in this section a novel multi-task dual-
headed networks, which leverages private network parameters and element-wise adaptive gradient
perturbations to defeat reconstruction attacks and, simultaneously, maintain high model accuracies.
3.1 Secret Perturbation of Gradients via Polarization Loss
Fig. 3 illustrates a Secret Polarization Network (SPN), in which fully connected polarization layers
are kept private with its parameters not shared during the distributed learning process. Appendix
shows the pseudo codes of the proposed method.
Formally, the proposed dual-headed network consists of a public and a private SPN network based
on a backbone network: Ψ
(
ϕ( · ;w, b);wu, bu
) ⊕ Φ(ϕ( · ;w, b);wv, bv) : X → [0, 1]C ⊕ RK , i.e.
u ⊕ v = Ψ(ϕ(x;w, b);wu, bu) ⊕ Φ(ϕ(x;w, b);wv, bv) ∈ [0, 1]C ⊕ RK , where ϕ( · ;w, b) is the
backbone network. The multi-task composite loss is as follows,
L(Ψ⊕ Φ, y ⊕ t) :=α1 · LCE(u, y) + α2 · LP (v, t) (4)
=α1 ·
C∑
c=1
−yc · log(uc)︸ ︷︷ ︸
CE loss
+α2 ·
C∑
c=1
K∑
k=1
max(m− vk · tkc , 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
polarization loss
, (5)
where α1 and α2 are hyper-parameters with α1+α2 = 1. yc is an one-hot representation of labels for
class c, and tc ∈ {−1,+1}K is the target K-bits binary codes randomly assigned to each class c for
c = 1, · · · , C. Note that by minimizing the polarization loss, Hamming distances between threshold-
ed outputsBin(vk) of intra-class data items are minimized and, at the same time, Hamming distances
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Figure 4: Distributions of gradients at each layer. Left: distributions of gradients w.r.t. weights, w; Right:
distributions of gradients w.r.t. biases, b; Top: gradients by polarization loss; Bottom: gradients by CE loss.
Cosine similarities between gradients by polarization and CE losses are (from left to right): -0.0033, 0.1760,
0.0243, and 0.1861 respectively.
are maximized for inter-class data items (where Bin(vk) ∈ {−1,+1}, see proofs in Appendix). The
polarization loss therefore joints forces with the CE loss to improve the model accuracies.
At each step of the optimization, the gradient of the loss5w,bL
(
Ψ⊕Φ, y⊕ t) is a linear combination
of gradient of CE loss and polarization loss as follows,
5w,bL = α1 ·
C∑
c=1
(yc − uc) · ∂uc
∂w, b
+ α2 ·
C∑
c=1
∑
k∈Ic
(−tkc ) ·
∂vk
∂w, b︸ ︷︷ ︸
secret perturbation
, (6)
where Ic :=
{
k ∈ {1, · · · ,K}
∣∣∣m− vk · tkc > 0}.
Note that wv is kept secret from other participants including the adversary. The summand due to
the polarization loss in (6) is therefore unknown to the adversaries, and acts as perturbations to
gradients ascribed to the CE loss. Perturbations introduced by polarization loss, on the one hand,
protect training data with α2 controlling the protection levels. On the other hand, SPN gradients
back-propagated to the backbone network layers exhibit strong correlations with CE gradients (see
distributions and cosine similarities between gradients by polarization and CE losses in Fig. 4). We
ascribe improvements of the model accuracies brought by SPN to element-wise adaptive perturbations
introduced by polarization loss.
4 Experimental Results
4.1 Experiment Setup and Evaluation Metrics
Dataset. Popular image datasets MNIST and CIFAR10/100 are used in our experiments. Imple-
mentation of DP [1] method from Facebook Research Team 5 is used. Implementation6 of PPDL
[15] method from Torch/Lua are re-implemented in PyTorch/Python. PPDL is similar to gradient
pruning which is one of the suggested protections in [21]. We only show in this paper results with
5% and 30% of selected gradients, named respectively, as PPDL-0.05 and PPDL-0.3. We refer
reviewers to more results in the supplementary material. Implementation of Deep Leakage attack
[21], network architecture and default setting from the official released source code7 are used in all
experiments with training batch size set as {1, 4, 8} respectively. Following analysis in [19], we
adopt pattern-initialization for higher reconstruction successful rates.
Relative Mean Square Error (rMSE) (= ||x
∗−x||
||x|| ) is used to measure the distances between re-
constructed and original data. Membership Distance (distm(y∗, y)) is the averaged categorical
distances between recovered data labels and original labels. Tracing Distance (distt(x)) is the
averaged categorical distances between recovered participant IDs and original IDs, to which the
given data x belongs.
5https://github.com/facebookresearch/pytorch-dp
6https://www.comp.nus.edu.sg/~reza/files/PPDL.zip
7https://github.com/mit-han-lab/dlg
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Figure 5: Privacy-Preserving Characteristics (PPC) of different mechanisms (dash-dotted PPC curves); orange
curves and y-axis (left): Acc of models; blue curves and y-axis (right): distances for attacks; x-axis: controlling
param. log10( ||BI ||||EB || + 1). Left to Right: DP, PPDL-0.05, PPDL-0.3 and SPN (Ours). Top: Reconstruction
Attack; Middle: Tracing Attack; Bottom: Membership Attack. See Fig. 6 for example reconstruction images.
(a) Left:1.04 (0.43); Right:1.13
(0.54)
(b) Left:1.01 (18.05); Right:1.00
(21.91)
(c) Left:0.86 (43.67); Right:0.02
(2186.8)
Figure 6: Reconstructed images from different region in Fig. 5. (a) Green region (b) White region (c) Red
region. Values inside bracket are ||BI ||||EB || and values outside are rMSE of reconstructed w.r.t. original images.
4.2 Comparison of Privacy Preserving Mechanisms
Fig. 5 illustrates example Privacy-Preserving Characteristic (PPC) of different mechanisms against
reconstruction, membership and tracing attacks, in which the controlling parameter along x-axis is
the ratio m of gradient magnitudes ‖BI‖ with respect to magnitudes of added perturbations‖EB‖. It
is shown that privacy attacks pose serious challenges to differential privacy based methods DP and
PPDL.
Reconstruction attacks (top row): when the ratio ranges between tens to thousands in red regions,
errors decrease rapidly and pixel-level information about original training data are almost completely
disclosed (see Fig. 6c). In the white regions, increased magnitudes of perturbations lead to large
reconstruction errors (rMSE ≈ 1.0) with noticeable artifacts and random noisy dots in Fig. 6b.
However, model accuracies for DP and PPDL methods also decrease dramatically. Pronounced drops
in accuracies (with more than 20% for CIFAR10 and 5% for MNIST) are observed when added
perturbations exceed magnitudes of original gradients (in green regions), beyond which condition (2)
of reconstruction attacks is no longer fulfilled and attacks are guaranteed to be defeated (see Theorem
2.2 and Fig. 6a).
Tracing attacks (middle row): similar trends were observed for distances of tracing attacks. In
addition, the distance increases as the number of participants increases. We refer reviewers to ablation
studies in supplementary material due to the limited space of this submission.
Membership attacks (bottom row): the disclosing of memberships is more detrimental, with dis-
tances between reconstructed memberships and ground truth labels almost being zero, except for
PPDL-0.05 in the green region. With the increase of the number of classes (for CIFAR100) and the
training batch size (8), success rates of membership attacks dropped and the distances increased. One
may mitigate membership attacks by using even larger batch sizes, as suggested in [21, 19].
In a sharp contrast, Secret Polarization Network (SPN) based mechanism maintains consistent model
accuracies, even though gradient magnitudes due to polarization loss exceed gradient magnitudes of
7
(a) MNIST (b) CIFAR10
Figure 7: Comparison of accuracies for standalone local models, FedAvg global model and Federated SPN
model. Improvements over standalone models increase with the number of clients.
CIFAR10 CIFAR100
Reconstruction Membership Tracing Reconstruction Membership Tracing
BS 1 4 8 1 4 8 1 4 8 1 4 8 1 4 8 1 4 8
[1] 0.57 0.63 0.63 0.00 0.45 0.47 0.42 0.57 0.58 0.23 0.31 0.30 0.01 0.22 0.25 0.14 0.24 0.24
[15]∗ 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.00 0.37 0.44 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.02 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
[15]? 0.57 0.61 0.61 0.00 0.43 0.49 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.21 0.26 0.26 0.00 0.19 0.22 0.19 0.19 0.19
SPN 0.69 0.70 0.70 0.24 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.62 0.64 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.17 0.28 0.31 0.29 0.30 0.30
Table 1: CAP performance with different batch size and dataset for reconstruction, membership and tracing
attack. Higher better. BS = Attack Batch Size, [1] = DP, [15]∗ = PPDL-0.05, [15]? = PPDL-0.3
original CE loss. Superior performances of SPN mechanism in this green region provide theoretically
guaranteed privacy-preserving capabilities, and at the same time, maintain decent model accuracies to
be useful in practice. This superiority is ascribed to the adaptive element-wise gradient perturbations
introduced by polarization loss (see discussions near Eq. (6)).
4.3 SPN Polarization Network for Federated Learning
The dual-headed Secret Polarization Network (SPN) brought improvements in model accuracies in
a federated learning setting, in which MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets are evenly distributed among
all clients, resulting in small local training datasets on each client (for instance, there are only 500
CIFAR10 training data when the number of clients is 100). Substantial performances deterioration
were observed for local standalone models with large numbers of e.g. 100 clients (see Fig. 7).
Since local training data are i.i.d., the FedAvg algorithm [11] effectively improved the global model
accuracies about 2-4% for MNIST and 10-40% for CIFAR10. The proposed SPN, once integrated
with the FedAvg algorithm, consistently improved further model accuracies ranging between 2-3%
for CIFAR10 dataset and about 0.2% for MNIST (see more results in supplementary material).
The improvements are ascribed to element-wise gradients introduced by polarization losses (see
discussion in Sect. 3), which in our view advocate the adoption of SPN in practical applications.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
The crux of differential-privacy based approaches is a trade-off between privacy vs accuracy [15, 1].
As shown in [12] and our experiments, existing defenses such as sharing fewer gradients and adding
Gaussian or Laplacian noise are vulnerable to aggressive reconstruction attacks, despite the theoreti-
cal privacy guarantee. We extricated from the dilemma by hiding a fraction of network parameters and
gradients from the adversary. To this end, we proposed to employ a dual-headed network architecture
i.e. Secret Polarization Network (SPN), which on the one hand exerts secret gradient perturbations
to original gradients under attack, and on the other hand, maintains performances of the global
shared model by jointing forces with the backbone network. This secret-public network configuration
provides a theoretically guaranteed privacy protection mechanism without compromising model accu-
racies, and does not incur significant computational and communication overheads which HE/SMPC
based approaches have to put up with. We find that the combination of secret-public networks
provides a preferable alternative to DP-based mechanisms in application scenarios, whereas large
computational and communication overheads are unaffordable e.g. with mobile or IOT devices. As
for future work, the adversarial learning nature of SPN also makes it an effective defense mechanism
against adversarial example attacks. To formulate both privacy and adversarial attacks in a unified
framework is one of our future directions.
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Appendix A: Proofs of Reconstruction Attacks
Consider a neural network Ψ(x;w, b) : X → RC , where x ∈ X , w and b are the weights and biases of neural
networks, and C is the output dimension. In a machine learning task, we optimize the parameters w and b of
neural network Ψ with a loss function L(Ψ(x;w, b), y), where x is the input data and y is the ground truth
labels. We abbreviate loss function as L and denote the superscript w[i] and b[i] as the i-th layer weights and
biases.
Suppose a multilayer neural network Ψ := Ψ[L−1] ◦ Ψ[L−2] ◦ · · · ◦ Ψ[0]( · ;w, b) is C1, where the i-th layer
Ψ[i] is a fully-connected layer with the step forward propagation as follows,
o[i+1] = a
(
w[i] · o[i] + b[i]),
where o[i], o[i+1],w[i] and b[i] are an input vector, an output vector, a weight matrix and a bias vector respectively,
and a is the activation function in the i-th layer.
By the backpropagation, we have the matrix derivatives on Ψ[i] as follows,
∇w[i]L = ∇o[i+1]L · a′
(
w[i] · o[i] + b[i]) · o[i]T
∇b[i]L = ∇o[i+1]L · a′
(
w[i] · o[i] + b[i]) · I,
which yield the following output equations:
∇w[i]L = ∇b[i]L · o[i]
T
, (7)
where gradients∇w[i]L and∇b[i]L are supposed to be shared in a distributed learning setting, and known to
honest-and-curious adversaries who may launch reconstruction attacks on observed gradients.
Figure 8: A pictorial example illustrating how to switch a convolution operator to a matrix multiplication.
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Remark. Any convolution layers can be converted into a fully-connected layer by simply stacking together
spatially shifted convolution kernels, as noted in Footnote 3. A simple illustration refers to Figure 8 and detailed
algorithm refers to a technical report 8.
Remark. Suppose∇w[i]L ∈ RM·N ,∇b[i]L ∈ RM and o[i] ∈ RN , we write
∇w[i]L :=
(
∂L
∂w
[i]
mn
)
1≤m≤M ;
1≤n≤N.
, ∇b[i]L :=
(
∂L
∂b
[i]
1
, . . . , ∂L
∂b
[i]
M
)T
, and o[i] :=
(
o
[i]
1 , . . . , o
[i]
N
)T
.
By the piecewise matrix multiplication, Equation 7 becomes as a linear system in a formal convention as follows,
∂L
∂w
[i]
mn
=
∂L
∂b
[i]
m
· o[i]n , for 1 ≤ m ≤ M and 1 ≤ n ≤ N.
Hence, we can write the partial derivative∇b[i]L as anmn×mn diagonal matrix that each n adjacent diagonal
entries in an order are copies of each entry, and partial derivative∇w[i]L as an mn-dimensional vector.
In the following paragraph, we always abbreviate equation coefficients ∇w[i]L and ∇b[i]L to W [i] and B[i]
respectively.
Lemma 5.1. Suppose d[0] and d[1], · · · , d[L] are dimensions of input image x and output vectors o[1], · · · , o[L]
respectively. x and o[i] can be estimated by solving the following d[i] · d[i+1]-dimensional linear system if it is
well-posed,
W [0] = B[i] · x (8)
or W [i] = B[i] · o[i]T , for i = 1, · · · , L− 1. (9)
Remark. Output vectors o[1], · · · , o[L] are outputs of neural networks Ψ( · ;w, b) on input image x. However,
solving Linear System (9) are always numerically unstable in that minor numerical perturbation of B[i] around
0 would yield the infinity solution even if it is a well-posed problem. Hence, it is not typically to directly recover
input image x and output vectors o[1], · · · , o[L] by simple matrix computations in practice.
Lemma 5.2. Assume the linear system B · x = W is corrupted in coefficients written as B¯ · x¯ = W¯ . If B is
nonsingular, we have the following inequality,
||x− x¯|| ≤ ||B−1|| · (||W − W¯ ||+ ||B − B¯|| · ||x¯||).
Proof. Obviously, we have
B · (x− x¯) = (W − W¯ ) + (B − B¯) · x¯, (10)
which yields this lemma if B is nonsingular.
According to Lemma 5.1 and Lemma 5.2, we have the following existing theorem.
Theorem 5.3. Suppose a multilayer neural network Ψ := Ψ[L−1] ◦Ψ[L−2] ◦ · · · ◦Ψ[0]( · ;w, b) is C1, where
the i-th layer Ψ[i] is a fully-connected layer. Then, initial input x∗ of Ψ exists, provided that: if there is an i
(1 ≤ i ≤ L) such that
1. Jacobian matrix Dx
(
Ψ[i−1] ◦Ψ[i−1] ◦ · · · ◦Ψ[0]) around x is full-rank;
2. Partial derivative∇b[i]L
(
Ψ(x;w, b), y
)
is nonsingular.
Moreover, we have the following inequality around x∗,
||x− x∗|| ≤M · ||∇w[i],b[i]L
(
Ψ(x;w, b), y
)−∇w[i],b[i]L(Ψ(x∗;w, b), y)||. (11)
Proof. WLOG, we suppose i yields that Jacobian matrix Dx
(
Ψ[i−1] ◦Ψ[i−1] ◦ · · · ◦Ψ[0]) around x is full-rank.
By the implicit function theorem, there exists a bounded inverse function
(
Ψ[i−1]◦Ψ[i−1]◦· · ·◦Ψ[0])−1(· ;w, b)
around x, s.t. ∣∣(Ψ[i−1] ◦Ψ[i−1] ◦ · · · ◦Ψ[0])−1(· ;w, b)∣∣ ≤M [i]. (12)
Since partial derivative∇b[i]L is nonsingular, vector o[i] is solved by matrix computations in Lemma 5.1, and
thus the initial image x∗ :=
(
Ψ[i−1] ◦Ψ[i−1] ◦ · · · ◦Ψ[0])−1(o[i]).
8Wei Ma, Jun Lu: An Equivalence of Fully Connected Layer and Convolutional Layer. https://arxiv.
org/pdf/1712.01252.pdf
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By Lemma 5.2 and Inequality (12), in an open neighborhood of x∗, we have
||x− x∗|| =||(Ψ[i−1] ◦Ψ[i−1] ◦ · · · ◦Ψ[0])−1(o[i] ;w, b)− (Ψ[i−1] ◦Ψ[i−1] ◦ · · · ◦Ψ[0])−1(o[i]∗ ;w, b)||
≤M [i] · ||o[i] − o[i]∗||
≤M [i] · ||∇b[i]L−1|| ·
(||∇w[i]L(Ψ(x;w, b), y)−∇w[i]L(Ψ(x∗;w, b), y)||
+ ||x∗|| · ||∇b[i]L(Ψ(x;w, b), y)−∇b[i]L(Ψ(x∗;w, b), y)||
)
≤M · ||∇w[i],b[i]L
(
Ψ(x;w, b), y
)−∇w[i],b[i]L(Ψ(x∗;w, b), y)||,
where we pick enough big number M := M [i] · ||x∗|| · ||∇b[i]L−1||+ 1.
Remark. 1) In the deep leakage approach [21], the recovery of initial image requires model parametersW
and the corresponding gradients∇W such that a minimization of gradient differences ||∇W ′ −∇W|| yields
a recovery of initial image if the initial image exists. Our theorem provides sufficient conditions of the initial
image existence, and Inequality (11) confirms the effectiveness of the deep leakage approach.
2) Essentially, deep leakage approach is a trade-off computational technique for the matrix approach in the
meaning that a loss in accuracy is trade-off with the existence of approximate solution by the optimization
approach. Both approaches require model parametersW and the corresponding gradients∇W .
3) If Jacobian matrix is not full-rank or∇b[i]L is singular, the inverse problem is ill-posed and a minimization
of gradient differences might yield multiple solutions or an infeasibility which is observed as noisy images.
If assumptions in Theorem 5.3 are met, we pick an index set I from row index set of B[i] and W [i] such that the
following linear equation is well-posed,
BI · x = WI ,
where BI := B
[i]
I and WI := W
[i]
I .
Theorem 5.4. Suppose there are perturbations EB , EW added on BI ,WI , respectively, such that observed
measurements B¯I = BI + EB , W¯I = WI + EW . Then, the reconstruction x∗ of the initial input x can be
determined by solving a noisy linear system B¯I · x∗ = W¯I , provided that
‖B−1I · EB‖ < 1; (13)
Moreover, the relative error is bounded,
‖x∗ − x‖
‖x‖ ≤
κ(BI)
1− ‖B−1I · EB‖
(‖EB‖
‖BI‖ +
‖EW ‖
‖WI‖
)
, (14)
in which B−1I is the inverse of BI .
Proof. According to the construction, we have
(B¯I −BI) · x∗ +BI · (x∗ − x) = W¯I −WI ,
which yields
x∗ − x = BI−1 ·
(
W¯I −WI − (B¯I −BI) · x∗
)
. (15)
Consider the relative error: since ||WI || ≤ ||BI || · ||x||, Equation (15) becomes
||x∗ − x||
||x|| ≤ κ(BI) ·
( ||EB ||
||BI || ·
||x∗||
||x|| +
||EW ||
||WI ||
)
, (16)
where condition number κ(BI) := ||BI || · ||BI−1||.
Moreover, according to Lemma 5.2, we have
BI · (x− x∗) = EB · x∗ − EW .
A simplification of the above equation, we have
x+ (BI
−1 · EB − I) · x∗ = −BI−1 · EW .
Take a norm on both sides, we have
‖x‖+ ‖BI−1 · EB − I‖ · ‖x∗‖ ≥ 0.
Since ‖B−1I · EB‖ < 1, we have
‖x∗‖
‖x‖ ≤
1
1− ‖BI−1 · EB‖ . (17)
Combine Equation (16) and Equation (17), we get Equation (14).
Remark. ‖B−1I ·EB‖ < 1 alone is a necessary condition for the iterative reconstruction algorithm to converge.
In other words, a big perturbation with ||EB || > ||BI ||, such as Gaussian noise with a sufficiently big variance,
is guaranteed to defeat reconstruction attacks like [21].
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Appendix B: Polarization Loss
Definition 2 (Polarization loss). For each data x ∈ X and its corresponding output vector v := Ψ(x;w) ∈ RK ,
the polarization loss is defined on the vector v with respect to a pre-set target binary code t ∈ H as follows,
LP(v, t) :=
K∑
i=1
max(m− vi · ti, 0), (18)
where the margin threshold is pre-set, m ≥ 1, for the bound in Lemma 5.5 to be strict.
Lemma 5.5. For output vector v = Ψ(x;w), the Hamming distance Dh(b, t) := 12 (K − b · t) between K-bits
binary hash code b = Bin(v) and the corresponding binary vector t is upper bounded by the polarization loss
Dh(b, t) ≤ LP(v, t), (19)
for any m ≥ 1 and v ∈ {(v1, · · · , vK)
∣∣vk ∈ R}.
Proof. On one side, there are two cases for each coordinate of Hamming distance Dh(b, t),
|bi − ti| ∈ {0, 2} if vi · ti > 0 or vi · ti ≤ 0;
On the other side, both above cases are upper bounded by max(m− vi · ti, 0) provided that if any m ≥ 1.
Sum up the residues of each coordinate, we get this lemma.
Proposition 5.1. Suppose class C consists of data points {x1, · · · , x|C|} associated with a pre-set target t ∈ H
in Hamming space. The averaged intra-class pairwise Hamming distances among the corresponding binary
codes {b1, · · · , b|C||bi = Φ(xi;w)} is upper bounded by,
1
|C|2 ·
∑
1≤i,j≤|C|
Dh(bi, bj) ≤ 2|C| ·
∑
1≤i≤|C|
LP(vi, t). (20)
Proof. According to Lemma 5.5 and the triangle law, we have∑
1≤i,j≤|C|
Dh(bi, bj) ≤
∑
1≤i,j≤|C|
Dh(bi, t) +Dh(bj , t)
≤
∑
1≤i,j≤|C|
LP(vi, t) + LP(vj , t)
≤ 2|C| ·
∑
1≤i≤|C|
LP(vi, t).
Divide |C|2 on both sides, we get this proposition.
Proposition 5.2. Suppose there are L classes in the dataset, i.e. C1, · · · , CL. For any two classes Cx and
Cy (1 ≤ x 6= y ≤ L), respectively, with associated targets binary vectors tx and ty and binary hash codes
bxi = Φ(xi; w), i ∈ {1, · · · , |Cx|}, byi = Φ(yj ; w), j ∈ {1, · · · , |Cy|}, the averaged inter-class pairwise
Hamming distances among binary codes
∑
1≤i≤|Cx|,
1≤j≤|Cy|
Dh(bxi , byj ) is lower bounded by,
∑
1≤x 6=y≤L
(
Dh(tx, ty)− 1|Cx| · |Cy| ·
∑
1≤i≤|Cx|,
1≤j≤|Cy|
Dh(bxi , byj )
)
≤
∑
1≤x≤L
2 · (L− 1)
|Cx| ·
∑
1≤i≤|Cx|
LP(vxi , tx).
(21)
Proof. By the triangle law, we have
Dh(tx, ty) ≤ Dh(tx, bxi ) +Dh(bxi , byj ) +Dh(byj , ty)
. Fix x, y and sum over i, j on both sides, we have
|Cx| · |Cy| · Dh(tx, ty)−
∑
1≤i≤|Cx|,
1≤j≤|Cy|
Dh(bxi , byj ) ≤ |Cy| ·
∑
1≤i≤|Cx|
Dh(tx, bxi ) + |Cx| ·
∑
1≤j≤|Cy|
Dh(byj , ty)
≤ |Cy| ·
∑
1≤i≤|Cx|
LP(vxi , tx) + |Cx| ·
∑
1≤j≤|Cy|
LP(vyj , ty).
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Divide |Cx| · |Cy| and sum over x, y on both sides, we have∑
1≤x 6=y≤L
(
Dh(tx, ty)− 1|Cx| · |Cy| ·
∑
1≤i≤|Cx|,
1≤j≤|Cy|
Dh(bxi , byj )
)
≤
∑
1≤x 6=y≤L
1
|Cx| ·
∑
1≤i≤|Cx|
LP(vxi , tx) + 1|Cy| ·
∑
1≤j≤|Cy|
LP(vyj , ty)
≤
∑
1≤x≤L
2 · (L− 1)
|Cx| ·
∑
1≤i≤|Cx|
LP(vxi , tx).
Proposition 5.3. The difference between averaged intra-class pairwise Hamming distance and averaged
inter-class pairwise Hamming distance is upper bounded, i.e.∑
1≤x≤L
1
|Cx|2 ·
∑
1≤i,j≤|Cx|
Dh(bxi , bxj )−
∑
1≤x6=y≤L
1
|Cx| · |Cy|
∑
1≤i≤|Cx|,
1≤j≤|Cy|
Dh(bxi , byj )
≤
∑
1≤x≤L
2 · L
|Cx| ·
∑
1≤i≤|Cx|
LP(vxi , tx)−
∑
1≤x 6=y≤L
Dh(tx, ty). (22)
Proof. By Lemma 5.1 and Lemma 5.2, we directly get this proposition.
Remark. 1) Inequality in (Eq. 20) shows that the averaged polarization loss is a strict upper-bound of the
averaged pairwise Hamming distances between points of the same class. That is to say, minimizing the RHS of
(Eq. 20) effectively minimizes the averaged intra-class pairwise Hamming distances.
2) In terms of the computational complexity, pairwise Hamming distances on the LHS of (Eq. 20) is O(|C|2)
while the polarization loss on the RHS of (Eq. 20) is O(|C|) only.
3) Inequality in (Eq. 21) shows that minimizing polarization losses on the RHS of (Eq. 21) effectively maximizes
the averaged inter-class pair-wised Hamming distances on LHS.
4) According to Proposition 5.3, the optimization problem of simultaneous minimizing the intra-class and
maximizing inter-class Hamming distances, i.e.
min
w
∑
1≤x≤L
1
|Cx|2 ·
∑
1≤i,j≤|Cx|
Dh(bxi , bxj )−
∑
1≤x6=y≤L
1
|Cx| · |Cy|
∑
1≤i≤|Cx|,
1≤j≤|Cy|
Dh(bxi , byj ),
is equivalent to the problem of minimizing the averaged polarization loss over the whole data set, i.e.
min
w
∑
1≤x≤L
1
|Cx| ·
∑
1≤i≤|Cx|
LP(vxi , tx).
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Appendix C: Experiment Setup
Dataset
In our experiments, we used MNIST, CIFAR10, CIFAR100 and SVHN, which are used in previous PPDL
studies.
Network Architecture
In our experiments, we used AlexNet, VGG16 and DLNet (from [21]).
For AlexNet and VGG16, we slightly modified the architecture implementation from torchvision9 package to
adapt a 32×32 input. In VGG16, we added Group Normalization after every Convolution layer. (See Table 4
and 5)
For privacy attack analysis, we used network architecture (DLNet) from released code 10.
Privacy-Preserving Mechanisms
For DP, we are using implementation from pytorch-dp package. Slightly modified to adapt to privacy attack
analysis. (We disabled the gradient clipping function.)
For PPDL, we reimplemented using reference from author released code 11.
For our SPN, we used α1 = 1 in all of our experiments. We random initialize the private target t, and using
64-bit in all of our experiments. (See Algorithm 1)
Privacy Attacks
For reconstruction attacks, we adopt author released code 10 to reconstruct images. We follow their implemen-
tation which we random initialized the model for reconstruction attack. (See Algorithm 5)
For membership attacks, we are using same algorithm from reconstruction attacks. (See Algorithm 5)
For tracing attacks, first, we perform reconstruction attacks to recovered X number of images, we used
X = 1000 in our experiments. Then we separated reconstructed images into N partitions simulating N
participants, we used N = 10 in our experiments. During tracing, we trace the query image from the
reconstructed dataset. The query images is the dataset that used for reconstruction attacks. We are using full
query dataset (e.g. 50000 images for CIFAR10) for tracing. (See Algorithm 6)
Federated Learning.
The federated learning environment is run with both IID and Non-IID dataset. For IID case, we uniformly split
training datasets into N partitions (with same number of data per class), respectively, for N participants, and
use all testing datasets for evaluation of the global model performances. For Non-IID dataset, we follows their
implementation 12 to separate the dataset into N participants using Dirichlet distribution with α = 0.9.
For DLNet, we are using round robin for model aggregation following implementation from 11 (See Algorithm
4). Otherwise, we are using FedAvg algorithm for model aggregation, which is following the implementation in
[11] and using source code from this 13 GitHub repository as reference.
Table 2 and 3 summarized the hyperparameters we used in this paper.
9https://pytorch.org/docs/stable/torchvision/models.html
10https://github.com/mit-han-lab/dlg
11https://www.comp.nus.edu.sg/~reza/files/PPDL.zip
12https://github.com/ebagdasa/backdoor_federated_learning
13https://github.com/shaoxiongji/federated-learning
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Hyperparameter Privacy Attack Analysis
Training Hyperparameters
Dataset MNIST, CIFAR10, CIFAR100, SVHN
Network Architecture DLNet [21]
Weight Initialization uniform(−0.3, 0.3)
Optimization method Adam
Optimizer Hyperparameter Adam (β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.999)
Learning rate 0.001
Learning rate decay No decay
Batch size 32
Local Epochs/Global Communication Rounds 1/300
Number of Clients 10
Privacy-Preserving Hyperparameters
SPN number of bit 64
SPN α2 0.0001, 0.001, 0.01, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5
PPDL shared percentage 5%, 30%
DP noise σ 0.0001, 0.001, 0.01, 0.1, 0.5
Deep Leakage Attack Hyperparameters
Attack Batch Size 1, 4, 8
SPN α2 0.0001, 0.001, 0.01, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5
PPDL shared percentage 5%, 30%
DP noise σ 0.0001, 0.001, 0.01, 0.1, 0.5
Table 2: Hyperparameters used in our privacy attack analysis.
Hyperparameter Federated Learning
Dataset MNIST, CIFAR10, CIFAR100, SVHN
Network Architecture AlexNet, VGG16
Weight Initialization kaiming_uniform
Optimization method SGD
Optimizer Hyperparameter Momentum = 0.9
Learning rate 0.01, 0.001
Learning rate decay Decay by factor of 0.5 at round 100 and 200
Batch size 64
Local Epochs/Global Communication Rounds 1/300
Number of Clients 8, 20, 50, 100
Privacy-Preserving Hyperparameters
SPN number of bit 64
SPN α2 0.1
PPDL shared percentage 5%, 30%
DP noise σ 0.1
Table 3: Hyperparameters used in our Federated Learning Task experiments.
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layer name output size weight shape padding
Conv1 32 × 32 64 × 3 × 5 × 5 2
MaxPool2d 16 × 16 2 × 2
Conv2 16 × 16 192 × 64 × 5 × 5 2
Maxpool2d 8 × 8 2 × 2
Conv3 8 × 8 384 × 192 × 3 × 3 1
Conv4 8 × 8 256 × 384 × 3 × 3 1
Conv5 8 × 8 256 × 256 × 3 × 3 1
MaxPool2d 4 × 4 2 × 2
Linear 256 256 × 4096
Linear 10 10 × 256
Table 4: Modified AlexNet
layer name output size weight shape padding
Conv1-GN × 2 32 × 32 64 × 64 × 3 × 3 1
MaxPool2d 16 × 16 2 × 2
Conv2-GN × 2 16 × 16 128 × 128 × 3 × 3 1
Maxpool2d 8 × 8 2 × 2
Conv3-GN × 3 8 × 8 256 × 256 × 3 × 3 1
Maxpool2d 8 × 8 2 × 2
Conv4-GN × 3 8 × 8 512 × 512 × 3 × 3 1
Maxpool2d 8 × 8 2 × 2
Conv5-GN × 3 8 × 8 512 × 512 × 3 × 3 1
MaxPool2d 4 × 4 2 × 2
Linear 256 256 × 4096
Linear 10 10 × 256
Table 5: Modified VGG16
layer name output size weight shape padding stride
Conv1 16 × 16 12 × 3 × 5 × 5 2 2
Conv2 8 × 8 12 × 12 × 5 × 5 2 2
Conv3 8 × 8 12 × 12 × 5 × 5 2 1
Conv4 8 × 8 12 × 12 × 5 × 5 2 1
Linear 10 10 × 768
Table 6: DLNet from [21]
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Appendix D: Privacy-Preserving Capability
In this section, we show experiment results of Privacy-Preserving Characteristics (PPC) and Calibrated Averaged
Performance (CAP) for different dataset and different attack batch size. During our experiment, we found out
that Sigmoid activation layer is having gradient vanishing problem, causing difficulty in training model on
SVHN. Therefore, we replace Sigmoid with Tanh activation layer specifically for SVHN to measure PPC and
CAP, while MNIST, CIFAR10 and CIFAR100 are measured with Sigmoid.
To measure PPC and CAP, we are using model trained on 10 clients using Federated Averaged algorithm as
mentioned in Appendix C with batch size of 32. We are using IID dataset which we uniformly split into 10
clients.
5.1 MNIST
5.1.1 Privacy-Preserving Characteristics (PPC)
(a) Reconstruction Attack
(b) Membership Attack
(c) Tracing Attack
Figure 9: Attack with Batch Size 1
18
(a) Reconstruction Attack
(b) Membership Attack
(c) Tracing Attack
Figure 10: Attack with Batch Size 4
(a) Reconstruction Attack
(b) Membership Attack
(c) Tracing Attack
Figure 11: Attack with Batch Size 8
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5.1.2 Calibrated Averaged Performance (CAP)
Reconstruction Membership Tracing
BS 1 4 8 1 4 8 1 4 8
DP [1] 3.38 3.83 3.69 0.00 0.71 0.79 0.91 0.93 0.95
PPDL-0.05 [15] 4.42 3.62 4.13 0.37 0.72 0.77 0.92 0.92 0.92
PPDL-0.3 [15] 4.04 4.65 3.91 0.00 0.66 0.80 0.95 0.95 0.95
SPN (ours) 4.30 3.72 4.33 0.37 0.73 0.81 0.90 0.93 0.94
Table 7: CAP performance with different batch size on MNIST for reconstruction, membership, and tracing
attack. Higher better. BS = Attack Batch Size.
5.1.3 Reconstructed Images
(a) 5.17(0.37) (b) 4.70(16.89) (c) 1.46(1011.30)
Figure 12: Reconstructed images from different region mentioned in the main paper. (a) Green region (b)
White region (c) Red region. Values inside bracket are mean of ||BI ||||EB || and values outside are mean of rMSE of
reconstructed w.r.t. original images. High rMSE (e.g. 1.46 in the red region) is due to original image is having a
lot of zero valued pixel, hence getting smaller ||x|| and higher rMSE. Also, found out that images that have solid
color pixels (e.g. fully dark (0,0,0) or fully white (255,255,255)) are more difficult to attack.
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5.2 CIFAR10
5.2.1 Privacy-Preserving Characteristics (PPC)
(a) Reconstruction Attack
(b) Membership Attack
(c) Tracing Attack
Figure 13: Attack with Batch Size 1
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(a) Reconstruction Attack
(b) Membership Attack
(c) Tracing Attack
Figure 14: Attack with Batch Size 4
(a) Reconstruction Attack
(b) Membership Attack
(c) Tracing Attack
Figure 15: Attack with Batch Size 8
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5.2.2 Calibrated Averaged Performance (CAP)
Reconstruction Membership Tracing
BS 1 4 8 1 4 8 1 4 8
DP [1] 0.57 0.63 0.63 0.00 0.45 0.47 0.42 0.57 0.58
PPDL-0.05 [15] 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.00 0.37 0.44 0.50 0.50 0.50
PPDL-0.3 [15] 0.57 0.61 0.61 0.00 0.43 0.49 0.54 0.54 0.54
SPN (ours) 0.69 0.70 0.70 0.24 0.50 0.56 0.61 0.63 0.64
Table 8: CAP performance with different batch size on CIFAR10 for reconstruction, membership, and tracing
attack. Higher better. BS = Attack Batch Size.
5.2.3 Reconstructed Images
(a) 1.05(0.36) (b) 1.05(18.44) (c) 0.48(1106.17)
Figure 16: Reconstructed images from different region mentioned in the main paper. (a) Green region (b)
White region (c) Red region. Values inside bracket are mean of ||BI ||||EB || and values outside are mean of rMSE of
reconstructed w.r.t. original images. Noted that some images are having solid color pixels (e.g. the frog image),
causing difficulty in reconstruction (e.g. noise pixel in the white solid color region), which is similar to MNIST
dataset.
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5.3 CIFAR100
5.3.1 Privacy-Preserving Characteristics (PPC)
(a) Reconstruction Attack
(b) Membership Attack
(c) Tracing Attack
Figure 17: Attack Batch Size 1
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(a) Reconstruction Attack
(b) Membership Attack
(c) Tracing Attack
Figure 18: Attack with Batch Size 4
(a) Reconstruction Attack
(b) Membership Attack
(c) Tracing Attack
Figure 19: Attack with Batch Size 8
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Figure 13, 14, 15 are privacy-preserving characteristics (PPC) with different attacks on CIFAR100.
5.3.2 Calibrated Averaged Performance (CAP)
Reconstruction Membership Tracing
BS 1 4 8 1 4 8 1 4 8
DP [1] 0.23 0.31 0.30 0.03 0.22 0.25 0.14 0.24 0.24
PPDL-0.05 [15] 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.02 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
PPDL-0.3 [15] 0.21 0.26 0.26 0.00 0.19 0.22 0.19 0.19 0.19
SPN (ours) 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.17 0.28 0.31 0.29 0.30 0.30
Table 9: CAP performance with different batch size on CIFAR100 for reconstruction, membership and tracing
attack. Higher better. BS = Attack Batch Size.
5.3.3 Reconstructed Images
(a) 1.12(0.32) (b) 1.11(23.63) (c) 0.77(876.73)
Figure 20: Reconstructed images from different region mentioned in the main paper. (a) Green region (b)
White region (c) Red region. Values inside bracket are mean of ||BI ||||EB || and values outside are mean of rMSE of
reconstructed w.r.t. original images.
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5.4 SVHN
5.4.1 Privacy-Preserving Characteristics (PPC)
(a) Reconstruction Attack
(b) Membership Attack
(c) Tracing Attack
Figure 21: Attack Batch Size 1
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(a) Reconstruction Attack
(b) Membership Attack
(c) Tracing Attack
Figure 22: Attack with Batch Size 4
(a) Reconstruction Attack
(b) Membership Attack
(c) Tracing Attack
Figure 23: Attack with Batch Size 8
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5.4.2 Calibrated Averaged Performance (CAP)
Reconstruction Membership Tracing
BS 1 4 8 1 4 8 1 4 8
DP [1] 0.77 0.84 0.85 0.00 0.50 0.65 0.68 0.72 0.72
PPDL-0.05 [15] 0.79 0.80 0.80 0.00 0.52 0.64 0.70 0.70 0.70
PPDL-0.3 [15] 0.72 0.82 0.81 0.00 0.54 0.63 0.68 0.68 0.68
SPN (ours) 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.60 0.66 0.70 0.66 0.79 0.79
Table 10: CAP performance with different batch size on SVHN for reconstruction, membership and tracing
attack. Higher better. BS = Attack Batch Size.
5.4.3 Reconstructed Images
(a) 0.99(0.39) (b) 0.93(20.86) (c) 0.35(1251.48)
Figure 24: Reconstructed images from different region mentioned in the main paper. (a) Green region (b)
White region (c) Red region. Values inside bracket are mean of ||BI ||||EB || and values outside are mean of rMSE of
reconstructed w.r.t. original images.
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5.5 Summary of Calibrated Averaged Performance
(a) Attack Batch Size 1. Left to Right: MNIST, CIFAR10, CIFAR100 and SVHN
(b) Attack Batch Size 4. Left to Right: MNIST, CIFAR10, CIFAR100 and SVHN
(c) Attack Batch Size 8. Left to Right: MNIST, CIFAR10, CIFAR100 and SVHN.
Figure 25: Comparison of Calibrated Averaged Performances (CAPs) for the proposed SPN, PPDL [15] and
DP [1] methods, against reconstruction, membership and tracing attacks (CAP the higher the better, see threat
model and evaluation protocol in main paper).
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Appendix E: Ablation Studies
5.6 Replace Gaussian Noise with Laplacian Noise
In this section, we replace Gaussian Noise with Laplacian Noise. For Laplcian noise and Gaussian noise, the
scales we used are {0.5, 0.1, 0.01, 0.001, 0.0001}.
In Figure 26, Laplacian noise and Gaussian noise with the same scale are having almost identical ||BI ||||EB || and
protection strength (i.e. rMSEs at different ||BI ||||EB || are almost the same).
Figure 26: Left: CIFAR10; Right: CIFAR100.
5.7 Effect of Number of Bits in SPN
In this section, we shows that with number of bits in SPN will affect ||BI ||||EB || and hence improves the protection
against reconstruction attack.
From 32-bit to 128-bit, ||BI ||||EB || increased as shown in Figure 27, protection strength (i.e. rMSE) is also increased.
Figure 27: Left: CIFAR10; Right: CIFAR100.
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Appendix F: Federated Learning
5.8 Accuracies for Privacy Attack Analysis
Table 11 shows accuracies of different privacy-preserving mechanisms using DLNet as network architecture and
using round robin for model aggregation. Accuracies are measured using test dataset on server model. For SPN,
we are using 64-bit.
MNIST CIFAR10 CIFAR100 SVHN
DP-0.5 0.9466 0.4205 0.0876 0.6882
DP-0.1 0.9757 0.5808 0.2084 0.8295
DP-0.01 0.9922 0.6853 0.3614 0.8950
DP-0.001 0.9942 0.7027 0.3803 0.8980
DP-0.0001 0.9925 0.7025 0.3902 0.9015
PPDL-0.05, DP-0.5 0.9305 0.3783 0.0469 0.5151
PPDL-0.05, DP-0.1 0.9708 0.5184 0.1497 0.8254
PPDL-0.05, DP-0.01 0.9881 0.6081 0.2323 0.8829
PPDL-0.05, DP-0.001 0.9886 0.5906 0.2237 0.8894
PPDL-0.05, DP-0.0001 0.9897 0.5814 0.2068 0.8740
PPDL-0.3, DP-0.5 0.9466 0.4250 0.0894 0.5132
PPDL-0.3, DP-0.1 0.9775 0.5672 0.1931 0.8424
PPDL-0.3, DP-0.01 0.9910 0.6783 0.3127 0.8992
PPDL-0.3, DP-0.001 0.9926 0.6672 0.3177 0.8992
PPDL-0.3, DP-0.0001 0.9934 0.6686 0.3223 0.8975
SPN-0.5 0.9936 0.6583 0.2990 0.8711
SPN-0.4 0.9939 0.6594 0.2999 0.8740
SPN-0.3 0.9933 0.6814 0.2999 0.8727
SPN-0.2 0.9937 0.6898 0.3230 0.8788
SPN-0.1 0.9927 0.6897 0.3457 0.8880
SPN-0.01 0.9928 0.6970 0.3843 0.9163
SPN-0.001 0.9938 0.6968 0.3768 0.9154
SPN-0.0001 0.9944 0.7154 0.3740 0.9126
Table 11: Accuracies of different dataset on DLNet with different privacy-preserving mechanisms and their
hyper-parameters. Bold values are highest accuracy among different mechanisms in the dataset.
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5.9 Accuracies on I.I.D dataset
(a) CIFAR10
(b) CIFAR100
(c) SVHN
Figure 28: Comparison of accuracies for standalone local models, FedAvg global model and models with
different privacy-preserving mechanisms (Federated SPN(α2 = 0.1), PPDL-0.3, PPDL-0.05 and DP-0.1).
Improvements over standalone models increase with the number of clients. Left: AlexNet; Right: VGG16;
F-SPN with α2 = 0.1 and DP-0.1 both having ||BI ||||EB || ≈ 1 which is considered borderline between green region
and white region, F-SPN-0.1 outperforms DP-0.1 in terms of performance (e.g. 25% test accuracy improved
in AlexNet CIFAR10.) while maintaining privacy guarantee. While comparing with PPDL with no DP added,
F-SPN consistently performs better than PPDL. We observed that PPDL-0.3 and DP-0.1 on VGG16 SVHN are
unstable which failed to train at 100 clients.
5.10 Accuracies on Non-I.I.D dataset
Figure 29: Left: AlexNet; Right: VGG16. For non-IID data, we split the dataset using Dirichlet distribution
with alpha = 0.9 as mentioned in Appendix C. F-SPN is also showing improvements over FedAvg increased
with the number of clients and on-par with PPDL-0.3 at 100 clients.
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Appendix F: Algorithm
Algorithm 1: Client Update
Input: local model Mi, private target ti, local dataset Di, global model G
1 Mi← download G from server ;
2 for each dj , yj ∈ Di do
3 u,v = forward(Mi, dj) ;
4 ∇Wi = backprop((α1 ∗ LCE(Wi,u, yj)) + (α2 ∗ LP (Wi,v, ti, yj))) ;
5 Wi = Wi − lr ∗ ∇Wi ;
6 ∆Wnewi = Wi −G ;
7 return ∆Wnewi
Algorithm 2: Server Update
Input: client ∆Wnewi , global model G
1 receive ∆Wnewi from K clients ;
2 Gnew = G+ 1
K
∑K
i=1 ∆W
new
i ;
3 return Gnew
Algorithm 3: Training Experiment (FedAvg)
1 Server: initialize global model G ;
2 for each client do
3 initialize private target ti ;
4 for each communication do
5 for each client do
6 ∆Wnewi = Client Update ; // Client Update
7 Gnew = Server Update ; // Server Update
8 return Gnew
Algorithm 4: Training Experiment (Round Robin)
1 Server: initialize global model G ;
2 for each client do
3 initialize private target ti ;
4 for each communication do
5 for each client do
6 ∆Wnewi = Client Update ; // Client Update
7 Gnew = Server Update ; // Server Update
8 return Gnew
Algorithm 5: Reconstruction and Membership Attack (Deep Leakage Attack)
1 Input: Global model G, dataset D, number of reconstruction X , private target ti ;
2 for 1..X do
3 dx, yx← random sample from D ;
4 u,v = forward(G, dx) ;
5 ∇WG = (α1 ∗ LCE(WG,u, yx)) + (α2 ∗ LP (WG,v, ti, yx)) ;
6 drecx = INIT(shape of dx) ;
7 yrecx = INIT(shape of yx) ;
8 while not converged do
9 u = forward(G, drecx ) ;
10 ∇W recG = LCE(WG,u, yrecx ) ;
; // Attacker doesn’t know the existence of private term
11 minimize ||∇WG −W recG || ;
12 update drecx , yrecx ;
13 return Drec, Y rec ; // Reconstructed Images and Labels (Membership)
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Algorithm 6: Tracing Attack
1 Input: Reconstructed images Drec, query dataset D ;
2 Split Drec and D into N partitions ;
; // Index of reconstructed image is same as index of groundtruth image.
3 for dj , indexj ∈ D do
4 for dreck , indexk ∈ Drec do
5 MSE = ||dj − dreck || ;
6 if found lowest MSE then
7 tj = indexk
; // Assign index of reconstructed image into tracing result
8 if tj == indexj then
9 Tracing successful
10 return T ; // Tracing Indices
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